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We argue that inequality and growth are linked through differential fertility
and the accumulation of human capital. We build an overlapping-generations
model in which dynasties differ in their initial endowment with human capital.
Growth, the income distribution, and fertility are endogenous. Due to a quantity-
quality tradeoff, families with less human capital decide to have more children
and invest less in education. When initial inequality is high, large fertility dif-
ferentials lower the growth rate of average human capital, since poor families
who invest little in education make up a large fraction of the population in the
next generation. A calibrated model shows that this fertility-differential effect is
quantitativelyimportant. Wealso provideempirical evidencetoconﬁrm thelinks
between inequality, differential fertility and growth suggested by the model.
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11 Introduction
How does the income distribution of a country affect its rate of economic growth? We
argue that to answer this question it is essential to account for the fertility differen-
tial between the rich and the poor. The fertility differential matters because it affects
the accumulation of human capital. Assuming that we identify human capital with
education, future human capital is a weighted average of the education of today’s
children from families in different income groups, with the weights given by income-
speciﬁc fertility rates. Children from poorer families tend to receive less education.
If the fertility differential between the rich and the poor is large, more weight is put
on groups with less education. Therefore future human capital will be lower than it
would have been otherwise. If the fertility differential in turn increases with inequal-
ity, we would expect that countries with higher inequality accumulate less human
capital, and therefore grow slower.
We develop a growth model which captures this channel from inequality to growth.
Our framework isrelated to Glomm andRavikumar(1992), whoanalyze the effects of
public versus private education on growth in a model with ﬁxed fertility. We choose
a similar overlapping-generations framework, but model endogenous fertility deci-
sions along the lines of Becker and Barro (1988). Both fertility and education are thus
chosen endogenously. Parents face a quality-quantity tradeoff in their decision on
children, and we show that education increases with the income of a family, while
fertility decreases with income. The aggregate behavior of the model depends on the
initial distribution of income. Other things being equal, we ﬁnd that economies with
a less equitable income distribution have higher fertility differentials, accumulate less
human capital, and have a lower rate of economic growth. In contrast, if we impose
fertility to be constant across income groups, the effects of inequality on human capi-
tal and growth are small.
We also ﬁnd empirical support for the relationships between inequality, differential
fertility, and growth postulated by the model. Kremer and Chen (2000) examine the
relationship between inequality and differential fertility. Using cross-country data,
they ﬁnd that more inequality tends to be associated with larger fertility differentials
within a country. This supports the ﬁrst part of our hypothesis, linking inequality
to differential fertility. To examine the second part of our hypothesis, the link from
differential fertility to growth, we add a differential-fertility variable to a standard
growth regression, and ﬁnd large signiﬁcant effects of differential fertility on growth.
In the same regressions, the direct effects of inequality as measured by Gini coefﬁ-
cients is insigniﬁcant.
In essence, we are proposing a new mechanism that links inequality and growth
through fertility and the accumulation of human capital. There is a large existing
literature on inequality and growth. The majority of this literature concentrates on
2channels in which inequality affects growth through the accumulation of physical
capital (see Benabou 1996). Althaus (1980) is the only model that we are aware of that
works out the effects of differential fertility on growth. However, in Althaus’ model
fertility is exogenously given, and the role of human capital is not considered. In
Galor and Zang (1997), inequality affects growth through its effect on overall fertility
and human capital. Borrowing constraints play a crucial role in their analysis, while
differential fertility is not considered. Morand (1999) has a model of inequality and
fertility in which the sole motive for fertility is old-age support. He concentrates on
the possibility of poverty traps when the initial level of human capital is too low. An-
other related model is Dahan and Tsiddon (1998). They examine a model with two
skill levels, endogenous fertility, and capital market imperfections. Since the model
does not allow for long-run growth, the analysis concentrates on the transition to the
steady state. On the empirical side, Barro (2000) studies of the link between growth
and inequality, based on a newly available data set on inequality across countries
and over time. His study does not consider the role of differential fertility, however.
Perotti (1996) ﬁnds that demographic variables are important for understanding the
growth effects of the income distribution, but once again differential fertility is not
considered directly.
In the following section, we will introduce the model. Section 3 presents theoretical
results, and in Section 4 we calibrate and simulate the model. Empirical evidence is
discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model Economy
Time is discrete and goes from 0 to
1. The economy is populated by overlapping
generations of people who live for three periods, childhood, adulthood, and old age.
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t is the wage per unit of human capital. We assume that the average human
capital of teachers equals the average human capital in the population
￿
h
t,s ot h a t







t. The assumption that teachers instead of
parents provide education is crucial for generating fertility differentials. It implies
that the cost of education does not depend on the parent’s wage. In contrast, since
raising each child takes a ﬁxed amount of the parent’s time, having many children is
more costly for parents who have high wages. Parents with high human capital and
high wages therefore substitute child quality for child quantity, and decide to have
less children with more education.
The only friction in the model is that children cannot borrow to ﬁnance their own
education. Instead, education has to be paid for by the parents. This assumption
is made in most studies of the joint determination of fertility and education. In the
real world, children generally do not ﬁnance their own education (at least up to the
secondary level), and we do observe a fair amount of intergenerational persistence in
education levels.




















1 depends on human
capital of the parents
h
t, average human capital
￿
h












































). The presence of
￿ guarantees that
human capital remains positive even if parents do not invest in education.
Production of the consumption good is carried out by a single representative ﬁrm
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1 are functions of the individual state
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t. Average human capital
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This last condition reﬂects the fact that the time devoted to teaching is not available
for goods production.






), an initial stock of physi-
cal capital
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0, and an initial population size
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1 maximize utility subject to the
constraints (1), (2),a n d(3);









t are such that markets clear, i.e., (7) and (8) hold;






t are given by (4) and (6).
3 Theoretical Results
We ﬁrst characterize the quality-quantity tradeoff faced by individuals. We next ﬁnd
sufﬁcient conditions under which a balanced growth path exists. Finally we study
the dynamics of individual human capital as a function of the parameters.
53.1 The Tradeoff between the Quality and Quantity of Children


























































































which reﬂects the well-documented fact that skilled people invest relatively more in

































￿ holds, the optimal
choice for education
e



















Oncethechoice foreducationiszero, fertility nolongerincreasesasthe humancapital
endowment falls.
Fertility as a function of human capital is plotted in Figure 1. The horizontal part of
the relationship corresponds to the range of human capital which leads to a choice
of zero for education
e




































Figure 1: Fertility as a function of human capital

























This relationship will turn out to be helpful to interpret the role of the parameter
￿
and to calibrate its value.
The results derived so far reﬂect the main effects of inequality on growth that we are
interested in. Assuming that all dynasties choose positive levels of education, equa-
tion (10) shows that education is a linear function of relative human capital. If the
dispersion of human capital increases for a given average level of human capital, this
linearity implies that the average education choice will still be the same. However,
since the production function for human capital is concave in education, future aver-
age human capital will be lower if the distribution of human capital is less equal. This
would be true even if fertility were constant across familieswith different human cap-
ital levels. The fact that fertility is actually higher for people with low human capital
greatly ampliﬁes the negative effect of inequality on human capital accumulation.
3.2 The Balanced Growth Path
Tostudy the long-run behaviorof the economy, werewrite theequilibrium conditions
in terms of stationary variables. The capital/labor ratio
k
t, the growth rate of average
7human capital
g
t,a n dt h ep o p u l a t i o ng r o w t hr a t e
N

















































































































Prices follow from the competitive behavior of ﬁrms, which leads to the equalization


































) and by (10)
and (11) otherwise. The number of children for an adult with relative human capital
x













































































































































































































































g such that (14), (15), (16), (18), (19), and (21)
hold at all dates.
This dynamic system is block recursive. Given the initial conditions, we can ﬁrst use
(18) to solve for
n







distribution of relative human capital is given by equation (15). The aggregate pop-
ulation growth rate
N





from (21). Given any initial conditions, an equilibrium exists and is unique. More-
over, from these equations we can deduce that there is a balanced growth path in











1,i . e .t h e



















































































































solve equations (14), (15), (16), (18), (19) and (21). Q.E.D.
Along this balance growth path, there is no longer any inequality among households.
This holds because we have assumed that the only difference across households lies
in their initial level of human capital. If we had introduced ability shocks on top of
an unequal initial distribution of human capital, inequality would persist along the
balancedgrowth path. However, thisinequalitywouldsimplyreﬂecttherandomness





￿ from here on. To analyze the stability of the balanced growth
path and the convergence of the distribution of human capital, numerical simulations
are required. Before doing that, we consider the dynamics of the human capital of an
9-
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￿
Figure 2: Steady states as a function of
￿
individual dynasty (of mass zero) around an aggregate balanced growth path. This
will be useful to understand the role of the parameter
￿ and interpret the numerical
results of Section 4.3.
3.3 The Dynamics of Individual Human Capital
We assume that the economy is on a balanced growth path, so that the growth rate





?. We focus on the effect of the
parameter



















































A detailed study of this function is performed in the appendix.
A complete characterization of the dynamics of
x as a function of the parameter
￿ is
presented in the bifurcation diagram in Figure 2. The steady states
x are represented
on the vertical axis as a function of
￿.F o rs m a l l




which is globally stable. Once
￿ reaches a threshold
￿
￿ (given in the appendix) two
additional steady states appear. The lower one is stable and the second is unstable.
This threshold arises at the point where the cutoff value for an interior solution is a
steady state of the individual dynamics (see Figure 6).


























) undergo a transcritical
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This bifurcation occurs when an unstable and a stable ﬁxed point collide and ex-








This analytical study at given aggregate conditions is helpful to understand the nu-
merical simulations carried in the next section. When the growth rate is not at a
steady state, the phaseline of Figure 6 shifts depending on
g
t, and the dynamics can
be investigated by means of computational experiments.
4 Computational Experiments
The theoretical results in the previous section highlight two channels through which
inequality affects growth in this model. First, inequality in human capital leads to
inequality in education, and since the production function for human capital is con-
cave, inequality in education lowers future average human capital. Second, people
with lower human capital not only choose less education for their children, but also a
higher number of children. This differential fertility effect increases the weight in the
population on families with little education, which also lowers future human capi-
tal. The question arises which effect is more important, and how large the effects are
quantitatively. To answer this question, we calibrate our model and provide numer-
ical simulations of the evolution of fertility, inequality, human capital, and income.
The main ﬁndings are that the effects of inequality on human capital accumulation
1Note that beyond the bifurcation point the number of ﬁxed points does not change, whereas in a
saddle-node bifurcation two ﬁxed points either appear or disappear.
11and growth are sizable, and that the differential fertility effect is crucial for generating
this result.
4.1 Calibration
We choose the parameters of the model such that the balanced growth path resembles
empirical features of the U.S. economy and population. The model is calibrated un-
der the assumption that one period (or generation) has a length of thirty years. The
parameter
￿ is the capital share in the ﬁnal goods sector, and is set to
1
=
3 to match the
empirical counterpart. The discount factor
￿ mainly affects the ratio of human capital
to physical capital in the balanced growth path. Since this ratio depends on the choice
of units, it does not provide a convenient basis for calibrating
￿.G i v e nt h a t
￿ does
not inﬂuence qualitative features of the model that we are interested in, we choose a









0 (i.e., 0.99 per
quarter). The overall productivity
B in the production function for human capital





7. This value implies a






0 or 2% per year, which approximates the av-
e r a g eg r o w t hr a t ei nt h eU . S .T h ew e i g h t
￿ of children in the utility function governs
the growth rate of population in the balanced growth path. In the U.S. as in other in-
dustrialized countries, fertility rates are close to the reproduction level. Accordingly,
we choose
￿ such that the growth rate of population in the balanced growth path is








The remaining parameters concern the cost of children and the parameters of the
production function for human capital. These parameters are harder to calibrate,
since they do not correspond to easily observable features of the balanced growth
path. The elasticity
￿ of future human capital with respect to education governs the
maximum fertility differential in the economy. Speciﬁcally, the maximum differential







). In the data, the highest fertility differential
between women at the highest and the lowest education levels in any country is 2.74









￿ for having a child determines the overall opportunity cost
of children. Evidence in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Knowles (1999) suggests
that the opportunity cost of a child is equivalent to about 15% of the parents’ time
endowment. This cost only accrues as long as the child is living with the parents. If
we assume that children live with parents for 15 years and that the adult period lasts
30 years, the overall time cost should be 50% of the time cost per year with the child







5.T h ep a r a m e t e r
￿ also sets an upper limit
on the number of children a person can have. With our choice, a person spending all
2Since convergence to this steady state is slow, the model still allows for substantial population
growth for long time periods.
12time on raising children would have a little above thirteen children. A family of two
could have a little under 27 children.3
The parameter
￿ in the production function for human capital affects the education
choice of parents, and therefore determines the aggregate expenditures on education.
We choose
￿ such that in the balanced growth path total education expenditure as a









9. Our choice of
￿ and
￿ implies an elasticity of human
capital with respect to education of 0.6 at steady state, which is consistent with the
estimate by Heckman (1976).
The remaining parameter
￿ determines the weight of parental human capital in the

















￿ exceeds this limit, human capital of dynasties with different initial human capital
diverges over time. Given our choices for the other parameters,






6. In principle, a precise value for
￿ c o u l db ec a l i b r a t e db ym e a s u r i n gt h e
inﬂuence of parent’s earnings on children’s earnings in the model and in the data.
While such measures are available for a number of countries, they cannot be com-
pared directly to the model. The reason is that we do not model varying ability of
children, which also would affect the correlation of parent’s and children’s earnings.
In light of this situation, our strategy is to provide simulation results for a variety of
values for
￿, in order to highlight the sensitivity of our results to this parameter.
Given our parameter choices, we still need to set the initial conditions for the simu-
lations. The overall size of the population and the average level of human capital are
scale parameters which do not affect the results, and are therefore set to one. Like-
wise, the distribution of physical capital does not matter, since capital is owned by
old people who have nothing left to decide. We therefore only specify the aggregate











2 are the mean and variance of the underlying normal distri-
bution. The parameter





1 . We provide simulations for different
variances of the distribution, in order to examine the effects of inequality. The initial
level of physical capital is chosen such that the ratio of physical to human capital is
equal to its value in the balanced growth path. The implied interest rate per year is
3.7%.
3If we also modeled a goods cost of having children, the upper bound would be somewhat lower,
and close to the maximum human fertility levels observed so far.
4This ﬁgure (Digest of Education Statistics, 1998, US Department of Education) does not include
on-the-job training, since it is not part of the parental investment in children.
134.2 Initial Inequality, Fertility, and Growth





0, the initial inequality
I
0, and the initial differential fertility
D
0 for different
variances of the distribution of human capital. Inequality is measured by the Gini
coefﬁcient
I
0 computed on the earnings of the working population. Differential fer-
tility is the difference between the average fertility of the top quintile and the bottom
quintile; this quantity is then multiplied by two to yield a number per woman. For
the computations the parameter
￿ was set to
0
:
2. To evaluate the role of differential
fertility in our model, we also computed results under the assumption of constant,
exogenous fertility.



















0.10 2.00% 0.00% 0.056 0.09 2.00% 0% 0.056 0
0.75 1.26% 0.66% 0.404 1.95 1.87% 0% 0.400 0
1.00 0.80% 1.08% 0.520 2.76 1.78% 0% 0.513 0
1.50 0.01% 1.71% 0.707 2.77 1.53% 0% 0.700 0
Table 1: Initial growth with and without endogenous fertility
The results in Table 1 show that inequality lowers growth both with and without en-
dogenous fertility, but the effects are much larger when fertility is endogenous. When







0), the difference be-
tween endogenous and exogenous fertility is small, and the growth rates are close to







5, substantial fertility differentials within the population begin to arise, and
the annual growth rate of human capital drops 0.74% below the steady state. With
constant exogenous fertility, the drop in the growth rate is six times smaller. Further







with endogenous fertility, while growth stays positive with exogenous fertility.
The results are robust with respect to the choice of
































out the same computations with a uniform instead of a log-normal distribution of
initial human capital. We still found that growth declines much faster with inequality
when fertility is endogenous. For example, when the Gini index goes from 0 to 0.33,
growth drops by 0.7% with endogenous fertility and by 0.1% with exogenous fertility.
The initial dispersion of human capital also inﬂuences the overall growth rate of pop-
ulation. When the variance of human capital rises, fertility of low-skilled households











Figure 3: The relationship Growth – Gini
increases, while high-skilled households decide to have fewer children. Because of
the shape of the fertility function (see Figure 1), the ﬁrst effect dominates and aggre-
gate fertility rises. This is in line with empirical studies that report a high positive
correlation between aggregate fertility rates and Gini coefﬁcients (see for instance
Barro 2000).
Figure 3 depicts the growth rate of human capital as a function of the Gini coefﬁcent.
The computed relationships with endogenous and exogenous fertility are drawn, il-
lustrating thattheslopeismuch steeperwithendogenousfertility. Inthedata, income
Ginis for a country vary roughly in the range 0.2 to 0.65. In the model, raising the ini-
tial Gini from 0.2 to 0.65 lowers the growth rate only by about 0.3% with exogenous
fertility, but by 1.4% with endogenous fertility. In a quantitative sense, fertility dif-
ferentials within the population are essential for the relationship between inequality
and growth.
We have also represented the slope of the regression of economic growth on income
Ginis run by Barro (2000) when the fertility rate variable is omitted. In this regres-
sion, the Gini coefﬁcient captures the intrinsic effect of inequality as well as the one










15regression line has been restricted to this interval. Our computational experiment is
consistent with the Barro (2000) ﬁnding: “A reduction of the Gini coefﬁcient by 0.1
would be estimated to raise the growth rate on impact by 0.4 percent per year.” Per-
otti (1996) reports effects of similar magnitude. Given that the standard errors of the
empirical estimates are sizable, not too much should be made out of the ability of the
model to match these point estimates. However, it is reassuring that our results are
in a range that seems empirically plausible.
4.3 The Dynamics of Inequality, Differential Fertility, and Growth
So far, we have only analyzed the effects of inequality on growth in the initial period.
Given a period length of 30 years, the ﬁrst period matters more than usual in this
model, but still the long-run dynamics are of interest. It turns out that the possibility
of corner solutions for education can lead to non-monotone behavior.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the growth rate of human capital, the population
growth rate, inequality, and differential fertility for different values of
￿.G r o w t h





1 . Figure 5 compares the density function of human capital after 18 periods





5, all variables converge monotonically to their steady-state val-
ues. Growth starts out low and then rises as inequality decreases. Population growth
and fertility differentials decrease as well. If
￿ is raised to
:
2, inequality still decreases
monotonically, but the growth rate of human capital ﬁrst decreases before converging
to the steady state, and population growth initially increases. This behavior is related
to the corner solution for education. A fraction of the people in the ﬁrst period de-
cides not to invest in education. Since these people have the highest fertility rates,
they make up an even larger fraction of the population in the next period. This leads
to an increase in population growth in the ﬁrst periods, and a decrease in growth
of human capital, since investment in education is low. Through the externalities in
human capital accumulation, however, after some time even the dynasties that did
not invest in education initially accumulate enough human capital to choose posi-
tive education. From this point on, the growth rate of human capital increases, and
population growth falls.
This non-monotone behavior only occurs if the initial distribution of human capital
is such that some people choose not to invest in education. If everyone is above the
threshold initially, convergence to the steady state is monotone. It is tempting to
interpret the initial rise and subsequent fall in population growth as a demographic
transition. However, this demographic transition only occurs given speciﬁc initial
conditions. To produce a believable model of a demographic transition (which is not
16Figure 4: Growth, fertility, Gini, and differential fertility for different
￿
our aim here) one would also have to explain why one would expect such an initial
distribution in the ﬁrst place.
If we increase







6,w ee n t e rt h er e g i o no ft h e
parameter space in which the dynamics of individual human capital are no longer
stable. The returns to parental human capital in the education function are not sufﬁ-
cientlydecreasingto compensatethe centrifugal force of tothe quality-quantity trade-
off. Two cases can arise. If
￿ is smaller than





the individual dynamics. This steady state is locally stable. The initially high skilled
dynasties are attracted there. Those who start out with low human capital get caught
in a poverty trap. Since low skilled dynasties have more children, the demographic






2 case, notice that the Gini ﬁrst increases and then decreases





4, there is no high steady state, and the relative human capital of the initially
skilled dynasties grows without bound. Inequality increases over time and the Gini
ultimately converges to one. As the income distribution diverges, differential fertility
increases again. The growth rate of human capital increases over time, but does not
reach the value of the balanced growth path with a collapsed income distribution.






















































Figure 5: Density functions after 18 periods
ent values for











2 conﬁrm that the distribution of
human capital converges to a degenerate steady state where everyone has the same









2, the density has a number of kinks. These kinks
correspond to the cutoff points for dynasties that were at the corner solution for ed-





3 shows a bimodal distribution of
human capital. This bimodal distribution reﬂects the case of two stable steady states
for the individual dynamics that we discussed in the bifurcation analysis. However,
the fact that the individual dynamics are stable around two steady states does not im-
ply that the limiting distribution is bimodal as well. As long as the dynasties at one of
the steady states have higher fertility rates, their fraction of the population will con-
verge to one, leading to a unimodal limiting distribution. Indeed, our computations
indicate that the limiting distribution is degenerate at
x
=











4, the distribution of human capital is unimodal around a point
x
smaller than one. In this case, there are only few dynasties with high human capital,
18but since they invest in a lot of education they account for a large fraction of total
human capital. The mass of people with above-average human capital tends to zero,
but the fraction of human capital accounted for by them tends to one.
To conclude, our dynamic simulations show that convergence to the balanced growth
path is slow even for low values of
￿ (recall that one period lasts 30 years). Even if
convergence in the Gini in monotone, fertility differentials and growth may be non-
monotone. In our simulations growth follow differential fertility more closely than
the Gini.
5 Empirical Evidence
Can the effects postulated by our model be supported by empirical evidence? The
ﬁrst part of our hypothesis, that income inequality leads to high fertility differentials,
has been analyzed by Kremer and Chen (2000). In line with our conjecture, they ﬁnd
that Gini coefﬁcients have a signiﬁcant and sizable positive correlation with fertility
differentials. In this section we examine the second part of our hypothesis, the link
from fertility differentials to growth. Our approach is to introduce a differential fer-
tility variable into a standard growth regression, and we ﬁnd that differential fertility
has a negative effect on growth. Moreover, when the differential fertility variable is
present, the Gini variable is no longer signiﬁcant in the regression.
5.1 Data
Our sample contains 68 countries for which data on fertility differentials is available.
The dependent variable (GR) in all regressions is the average annual growth rate of
GDP per capita over the periods 1960 to 1976 or 1976 to 1992 (the period depends on
the availability of fertility data). The GDP data is from the Penn World Tables, and
growth rates are continuously compounded and expressed as percentages.5 Since we
are interested in long-run growth, we chose the longest sub-sample periods available
in the Penn World Tables.
As Kremer and Chen (2000), for fertility differentials we rely on information from
the World Fertility Survey and the Demographic and Health Surveys on total fertil-
ity rates by women’s educational attainment (see Jones 1982, United Nations 1987,
Mboup and Saha 1998, and United Nations 1995). For countries that participated
in the World Fertility Survey (carried out around 1977), the independent variable is
growth in GDP per capita in the ﬁrst period, and for countries that participated in
5For countries where data from 1960 and/or 1992 was not available, we computed growth rates
over the closest available interval.
19Sample nobs data Mean S.D. Min Max
1960-1976 40 GR 1.95 3.65 -5.75 8.44
GINI 44.32 11.14 23.38 68.00
TFR 5.56 1.89 2.02 7.93
DTFR 2.23 1.56 0.22 5.30
1976-1992 43 GR 0.39 1.89 -3.46 4.97
GINI 45.91 9.56 28.90 69.00
TFR 6.06 1.08 3.37 8.00
DTFR 2.41 0.99 0.10 4.50
Total 83 GR 1.14 2.97 -5.75 8.44
GINI 45.14 10.32 23.38 69.00
TFR 5.82 1.54 2.02 8.00
DTFR 2.32 1.29 0.10 5.30
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
the Demographic and Health Surveys the left-hand side variable is growth over the
second period. Our differential fertility variable DTFR is the difference in the total
fertility rate between women with the highest and the lowest education level. For
some countries we have two observations from the Demographic and Health Sur-
veys, in which case we averaged the two resulting values. For 25 countries we have
only observations for the ﬁrst period, for 28 countries we have only observations for
the second period, and for 15 countries there are observations from both periods.
The remaining independent variables are the initial GDP per capita (GDP), the aver-
age ratio of investment to GDP (I/GDP), the average ratio of government expendi-
ture to GDP (G/GDP), the initial Gini coefﬁcient for the income distribution (GINI), a
dummy variable for African countries (AFR), and the initial total fertility rate (TFR).
I/GDP and G/GDP are from the Penn World Tables, and the income Ginis are from
Deininger and Squire (1996).6
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables in our analysis. The
6Where possible, the Gini coefﬁcients are from the initial year; otherwise we used the closest avail-
able year. For a few countries, no data is available in Deininger and Squire (1996). For Benin, Burundi,
Central Africa, and Namibia, we relied on the “Economic Report on Africa 1999: The Challenges of
Poverty Reduction and Sustainablity”, United Nations. For Haiti and Syria, only land Ginis from
(Jazairy, Alamgir, and Panuccio 1992) are available. We regressed the available income Ginis on the
land Ginis (correlation: 0.61) and used the predicted values.
20two sub-samples are similar, except that the growth rate is much lower in the second
sample. Since we will allow for different constant terms in the two sub-samples, this
difference will not play a role in the results. These will thus reﬂect cross-sectional
differences among countries, as well as variation over time within countries.
5.2 Estimation Results
One problem with the data is that our observations on fertility differentials are close
to the end of the period over which we compute growth rates. Since the fertility ob-
servations are ﬁve-year averages and result from decisions and actions taken even
earlier, the endogeneity problem is not too severe. Still, it would be preferable to ob-
serve growth rates for a prolonged period after observing fertility differentials. Given
our data, this would be possible only for a few countries. We correct for potential en-
dogeneity of the differentials by using instrumental variables.
Table 3 contains our estimation results. In all cases, the left-hand side variable is the
average growth rate of GDP per capita. The regression equation is estimated with
the Generalized Method of Moments. For countries that are present in both sam-
ple periods, we allow the error term to be correlated across the periods, and we use
instrumental variables to correct for possible endogeneity of I/GDP, G/GDP, GINI,
and DTFR. We allow the constant to differ across the periods (Constant A for the early
period and Constant B for the late period). Our regressions are designed to be compa-
rable to Barro (2000), but we include fewer variable because of the small sample size.
Regression (1) reproduces standard results in the growth regression literature: the in-
vestment rate has a positive effect, whereas the government share, initial GDP, and
the African dummy have negative effects on growth. Regression (2) adds the Gini
coefﬁcient. The estimated coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly negative and the size is close to
Barro’s estimate. The value of the parameter implies that an increase in the Gini of
0.4 (roughly the range of variation in the data) lowers growth by about 1.2% per year.
However, when the total fertility rate is included (regression 3), the coefﬁcient on the
Gini coefﬁcient changes sign and becomes insigniﬁcant, which is also in line with
Barro (2000).
Regression (4) includes the differential-fertility variable. The coefﬁcient on differen-
tial fertility is signiﬁcantly negative. The point estimate implies that an increase in
the fertility differential from one to two would lower growth by 0.7% per year. With
differential fertility included, the coefﬁcients on both Gini and TFR are insigniﬁcant,
and the point estimate on the Gini is positive.
Based on the results in Section 4, our model predicts that Gini, total fertility, and
differential fertility are all equally negatively related with growth. It is therefore not
clear why the coefﬁcients on the Gini and the total fertility rate become insigniﬁcant
once differential fertility is introduced. One possibility that the Gini is insigniﬁcant
21Independent Regression






















































? (0.01) 0.02 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04)
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The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP. Estimation by GMM. The in-
struments are: constant, log of per capital GDP at the beginning of the period, investment/GDP and
gov. spending/GDP at the beginning of the period, Africa dummy, tropics, and access to the sea vari-
ables of Sachs and Warner (1997), fertility and life expectancy at the beginning of the period, and the
openness variable from the Penn World Tables, at the beginning of the period.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. These are based on the heteroscedastic-consistent
covariance matrix of Newey-West. One star indicates signiﬁcance at the 10%, two stars indicate signif-
icance at the 5 % level.




n degrees of freedom, where
n is the number of over-identifying restrictions. Corresponding
P
￿values are reported in brackets.
L
R




is the test for the absence of both Gini and total fertility. As suggested by Gallant (1987), they are
computed as the normalized difference between the constrained objective function and the uncon-
strained one. The constrained estimation is computed with the weighting matrix provided by the
unconstrained estimation. The corresponding
p
￿value is reported in brackets.
Table 3: Generalized Method of Moments estimation
22because its relation to the growth rate is nonlinear. Our dynamic simulations showed
that along the transition path, Gini and growth as not as closely related as differential
fertility and growth. Another interpretation is that inequality and total fertility are
inﬂuenced by other factors which do not affect growth, while differential fertility is
observed with less noise. A third possibility is that total fertility and inequality have
other effects on growth, which are not present in our model and do not work through
differential fertility. If some of these effects on growth are positive and therefore offset
the negative effects, it would be possible that the overall effect of total fertility and the
Gini is insigniﬁcant once the differential-fertility channel is controlled for.
Hansen’s
J test measures how close the residuals are to being orthogonal to the in-
strument set. It can be seen as a global speciﬁcation test. The degrees of freedom
equal the number of restrictions imposed by the orthogonality conditions. These re-
strictions are never rejected at the 5% level. Moreover, there is a signiﬁcant improve-
ment in the value of the test when differential fertility is introduced. The signiﬁcance
of the differential fertility variable is veriﬁed both by its
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L
R
2 of joint insigniﬁcance of GINI and TFR is not
rejected.
In summary, we ﬁnd that standard growth regressions detect the effect of differential
fertility on growth postulated by our model. The effects implied by the regressions
are sizable. At the same time, including differential fertility leaves the direct effect of
the Gini coefﬁcient insigniﬁcant, with a positive point estimate. While the empirical
results are encouraging, they should be taken with a grain of salt. Growth regressions
have been shown to be sensitive to the choice of variables included in the regression.
For example, if we add initial life expectancy as an independent variable, the effect
of differential fertility is no longer signiﬁcant. This is not surprising given our small
sample size, but it shows that results from growth regressions are not always robust.
6 Conclusion
Most of the theoretical literature on inequality and growth has concentrated on chan-
nels in which inequality affects growth through the accumulation of physical capital.
In this paper we propose a different mechanism which links inequality and growth
through differential fertility and the accumulation of human capital. In our model,
families with less human capital decide to have more children and invest less in edu-
cation. When income inequality is high, large fertility differentials lower the growth
rate of average human capital, since poor families who invest little in education make
up a large fraction of the population in the next generation. A calibration exercise
shows that these effects can be fairly large. In the benchmark case, raising the Gini
from 0.2 to 0.65 lowers the initial annual growth rate by 1.4%. We also examine the
23role of differential fertility in the growth-regression framework used, among others,
by Perotti (1996) and Barro (2000). In line with the predictions of the theory, we ﬁnd
sizable negative effects of differential fertility on growth.
A natural direction for further research concerns the policyimplications of our model.
On the one hand, since differential fertility rather than inequality per se is the main
source of growth effects in the model, it is not clear that redistribution policies would
increase economic growth. Indeed,a typical outcome in modelswith endogenous fer-
tility is that direct income redistribution tends to increase fertility differentials, which
would lower the growth rate (see Knowles 1999). On the other hand, policies aimed
directly at the distribution of human capital would be expected to be more effective.
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Appendix. Study of the Individual Transition Function






































































































































































































depending on parameter values. The function is plotted in Figure 6.
By deﬁnition of theaggregate balanced growth path,
x
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￿. If, at this point, the function
￿ is negative, it implies that
it crosses the horizontal axes between 0 and
￿
￿
￿. The existence of this steady state results from
the inﬁnite slope of
￿ at 0 and from its continuity; uniqueness results from the concavity of
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We are now able to fully characterize the dynamics of
x as a function of the parameter
￿.
The bifurcation diagram is presented in Figure 2 and the different functions
































































Figure 6: The function
x
t
+
1
￿
x
t
=
￿
(
x
t
;
￿
)
27